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مجلس الأمن



رسالة مؤرخة ١٤ تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر ١٩٩٨ موجهة
إلى رئيس مجلس الأمن من الأمين العام

كما أبلغت أعضاء مجلس الأمن في اختتام جلسة الأمس، فقد قررت توجيه رسالة إلى الرئيس صدام حسين. وترد طيه نسخة من هذه الرسالة.

وعندما أحلت رسالتي عن طريق الممثل الدائم للعراق لدى الأمم المتحدة، أكدت على الطابع الملح لمناشدتي، وكررت الإعراب عن ألمي الكبير في أن يلغي العراق فورا القرارات التي اتخذها في ٥ آب/أغسطس و٣١ تشرين الأول/أكتوبر ويستأنف تعاونه الكامل مع اللجنة الخاصة للأمم المتحدة والوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية.

ويسرني أن أبلغ المجلس بأنني تلقيت هذا الصباح ردا إيجابيا على مناشدتي من نائب رئيس الوزراء طارق عزيز. وترد طيه ترجمة غير رسمية لذلك الرد الذي أرجو أن تتاح لأعضاء المجلس الفرصة لدراسته قبل الجلسة التي ستعقد بعد ظهر اليوم.

وأكون ممتنا إذا ما قمتم بإطلاع أعضاء مجلس الأمن على هذه الرسالة ومرفقيها.

(توقيع) كوفي عنان



المرفق الأول

رسالة مؤرخة ١٣ تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر ١٩٩٨ موجهة من الأمين العام إلى رئيس جمهورية العراق

كما لعلكم تعلمون بالفعل، فقد قطعت زيارة رسمية إلى شمال أفريقيا أمس وعدت إلى نيويورك بالنظر إلى الأزمة المتفاقمة المتعلقة بالعراق. وقد اجتمعت بعد ظهر ومساء اليوم بأعضاء مجلس الأمن لمدة أربع ساعات لاستعراض الحالة. وأستطيع أن أبلغكم أن جميع أعضاء مجلس الأمن، بلا استثناء، قد أعربوا عن تفضيلهم لإيجاد حل دبلوماسي للأزمة. وكما تدركون، فقد بذلت أنا نفسي جهودا متواصلة على مدار الأشهر الثلاثة الماضية لإيجاد هذا الحل.

وقد أيد مجلس الأمن بالإجماع أيضا البيان الصحفي الذي أصدرته في مراكش في ١١ تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر وضمّنته مناشدة شخصية إليكم، سيادة الرئيس، باتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة لكي يتسنى العثور على حل دبلوماسي. وتيسيرا للاطلاع على هذا البيان الصحفي، فإنني أورد نصه فيما يلي.

"لقد أحزنتني وآلمني قرار العراق الصادر في ٥ آب/أغسطس و ٢١ تشرين الأول/أكتوبر بعدم التعاون مع اللجنة الخاصة للأمم المتحدة.

وإنني أحث بقوة الرئيس صدام حسين والحكومة العراقية على إلغاء هذا القرار واستئناف التعاون فوراً مع مفتشي اللجنة الخاصة والوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية.

وقد أكد العراق منذ وقت طويل أنه يريد أن يرى الضوء في آخر النفق. وأنا أيضا أود أن تُرفع الجزاءات، حتى يستعيد العراق مكانه بين مجتمع الدول. وكما قلتُ مرارا، فإن السبيل الوحيد لتحقيق ذلك هو أن يتعاون العراق تعاوناً كاملاً مع مجلس الأمن التابع للأمم المتحدة. وقد وافق مجلس الأمن على المضي قدماً بإجراء استعراض شامل. وإنني لعلني قناعة راسخة بأن ذلك يوفر للعراق فرصة حقيقية. فالاستعراض الشامل سيحدد الخطوات الباقية، بشرط تعاون العراق، مما سيتيح له رؤية الضوء في آخر النفق.

ولقد جاء قرار القيادة العراقية بعدم التعاون مع اللجنة الخاصة في الوقت الذي كان يضطلع فيه المجلس بهذه الجهود مفاجئاً لي، ومفاجئاً، فيما أظن، لجميع أعضاء المجلس.

ولذا فإنني أناشد مرة أخرى الرئيس العراقي والقيادة العراقية اغتنام هذه الفرصة لاستئناف التعاون مع اللجنة الخاصة والوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية. فذلك سيكون خيراً للشعب العراقي وللمنطقة وللعالم".

ولا تزال هذه المسألة قيد النظر الفعلي لمجلس الأمن. ولذا سأكون ممثناً إذا ما وافقتمونا برد مبكر على مناشدتي.

(توقيع) كوفي ع. عنان

المرفق الثاني

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

**H. E. Mr. Kofi A. Annan
The Secretary General of
The United Nations
New York**

Excellency

Your letter dated 13/11/1998 addressed to President Saddam Hussein was presented to a joint meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council and the National Command of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party presided over by His Excellency the President. I was entrusted with the task of conveying to you the following:

- 1. The goal sought by Iraq from its decisions of 5 August and 31 October was not to sever the relationship with UNSCOM and the IAEA and to cease the implementation of its obligations under section C of SCR 687. The objective of Iraq is to end the suffering of its embargoed people and to see the implementation of paragraph 22 of SCR 687 as a first step for lifting the other sanctions.**
- 2. Due to its trust in you and your good faith, the Government of Iraq has dealt with your initiative regarding the comprehensive review. But unfortunately, the deliberations of the Council on the procedures for carrying out the review did not result in a clear picture which ensures fairness and objectivity in reaching the implementation of paragraph (22) of resolution 687, which represents the declared objective of the comprehensive review according to your proposal. It is well known that the main reason for that was the American position, which does not represents the prevailing opinion of the Council. That position, contrary to your initiative, objected continuously to the presentation of any clarity in regard to the objective of the comprehensive review.**
- 3. Despite the assurances that we have received from you and from many members of the Council that supported the main objective of the comprehensive review, and despite the confidence we have in you and in the majority of the Council members and our belief in your good faith and sincerity, those assurances were not satisfactory because they did not meet the basics from our point view.**

On the basis of what was stated in your letter, and in appreciation of the content of the letter of President Boris Yeltsin the President of the Russian Federation and Mr. Yevginy Brymakov the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, and the positive positions expressed and conveyed to us by China, France, Brazil and other States, and in order to give a further chance to achieve justice by lifting sanctions commencing with the implementation of paragraph (22) of resolution 687(1991), the Leadership of Iraq decided to resume working with the Special Commission and the IAEA and to allow them to perform their normal duties in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and on the basis of the principles which were agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding signed with you on 23 February 1998.

We offer this chance not out of fear of the aggressive American campaign and the threat to commit a new aggression against Iraq, but as an expression of our feeling of responsibility, and in response to your appeal and those of our friends. We affirm that the people of Iraq would not relinquish their legitimate right in having the inequitous embargo lifted and to live normally like other nations of the world. We will be looking forward to seeing the outcome of your efforts and the review.

Excellency

We rightly believe that if the comprehensive review were not to be a mere formality and to be free from the influences of the tendentious purposes, the adoption of the points we conveyed yesterday , 13/11/1998, to the Ambassadors of Russia, France and China, a copy of which I enclose herewith, will render the review serious, fair and fruitful.

We expect that you will continue with your efforts to to lay down the bases and the correct procedures for the review and so as to commence with as soon as possible.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(signed)

Tariq Aziz

Baghdad, 14 November 1998

First, the goal sought by Iraq from its decisions of 5 August and 31 October was not to sever the relationship with UNSCOM and the IAEA and to cease the implementation of its obligations under section C of SCR's 687 and 715.

Second, the objective of Iraq is to end the suffering of its embargoed people and to see the implementation of paragraph (22) of SCR 687 as a first step for lifting the other sanctions.

Third, Iraq expressed its readiness to engage in the comprehensive review which had been proposed by the Secretary General. But, as a result of American pressure, the results brought about by the consultations of the Council do not ensure an honest and objective review with the aim of implementing paragraph (22).

Fourth, the position of Iraq on the comprehensive review is:

- 1- The comprehensive review be carried out within a very short time, (seven days for example), after the resumption of UNSCOM and the IAEA of their normal duties. This is to be without conditions, (like those mentioned formerly in regard to what is called the confirmation of Iraq's cooperation).**
- 2- The comprehensive review fundamentally concentrates on paragraph (3) of the concept paper of the Secretary General of 5 October (the three Iraqi questions of 3 August) and emphasizes the question of evidence.**
- 3- The Council be ready to implement paragraph (22) if the fulfillment of the requirements of section C of SCR 687 is established.**
- 4- If the Council sees, through an objective study, that there are matters which need to be done, a short period be determined for their completion. Until that completion is reached, the Council implements**

measures for lifting or reducing sanctions in proportion to what has been fulfilled of the requirements of paragraph (22). Thereafter, the commencement with the implementation of paragraph (22) immediately upon the completion of the required work.

- 5- The Council assures the legal interpretation of section C of SCR 687 and that none of its members should impose additional conditions or restrictions on the implementation of paragraph (22).

Fifth, the second phase of the review commences after completing the conclusions of the first phase.

Sixth, the second phase of the review only encompasses the obligations determined by clear provisions of the resolutions and no matters be raised contrary to the legal interpretation of the resolutions.

Seventh, the members of the Council and specially the permanent members abide by international law and the relevant resolutions of the Council in respect of all matters pertaining to Iraq.

Eighth, the question of Butler and the structure of UNSCOM and its practices are important matters. The Council is to consider them seriously in order to ensure a good relationship in the future. We hope that this will be done as soon as possible.

Ninth, it is necessary that these assurances be communicated directly to the leadership in Baghdad either by the Secretary General or by a delegation from the Council.



13 Nov. 1998